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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
RHEAD. HINDMARSH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
0. P. SKAGGS FOODLINER,
Defendant and Appellant.

CASE
NO. 11160

Brief of Defendant and Appellan~
0. P. Skaggs Foodliner
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF OASE
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by
plaintiff when she fell after slipping on an accumulation of
ice and snow alleged to have been on the driveway entrance
leading to defendant's parking lot and place of business.
DISPOSmON IN LOWER OOURT
The case was tried to a jury. From a Verdict and
Judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appeals.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the plaintiff's Judgment
and Judgment in its favor, or that failing, a new trial.

STATEMEN.r OF FACTS
Defendant, a partnership, operates a grocery store on
the Southwest corner of the intersection of 200 West Street
and 100 North Street, Provo, Utah. As is evident from
plaintiff's exhibits numbered 1 through 5 the North side
of the store building is adjacent to the sidewalk on the
South side of 100 North Street; there is an entrance to the
store on the East side at the Northeast comer of the build·
ing and an entrance on the South side at the Southeast
corner of the building; a private sidewalk runs immediately
along the East side of the store building and between this
sidewalk and the public sidewalk on the West side of 200
West Street there is a driveway ~iting onto 100 North
Street with parking on either side; the first building im·
mediately to the South of the store building is what is designated as Pete's T.V., along the North wall of which there
are parking stalls for use of defendant's patrons and im·
mediately to the North of which there is an entrance-exit
from 200 West Street running in an East-West direction
along the South side of the defendant's store building and
between the parking stall areas along the North wall of
Pete's T.V. and similar parking stalls along the South side
of defendant's store building; and the Craghead's store
building is shown to be on the East side of 200 West Street
almost directly East of Pete's T.V. (TR. 6-18).
Plaintiff, Rhea B. Hind.mru-sh, a woman in her mid·
fifties, resides with her husband at 3235 North Canyon
Road, Provo, Utah. During the afternoon of December
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31, 1964, a cold clear day, plaintiff rode as a passenger in
an automobile driven by her husband from their home in
North Provo to the defendant's store for the purpose of
purchasing groceries and transacting other business in
town (TR. 77). Plaintiff's husband entered defendant's
parking lot from 200 West Street and parked the car in
one of the parking stalls immediately to the North of Pete's
T.V. Repair building and toward the West end thereof.
Plaintiff got out of the right side of the car, walked around
to the rear of the same and walked along the back end of
the family car and several ot!hers parked immediately to
the North of Pete's T.V. Repair Easterly to the sidewalk
on the West side of 200 West Street, then went to do some
shopping in several stores along center Street arid then
came back along the East side of 200 West Street to Craghead's Plumbing and Heating Company where she went
in to get a calendar. Plaintiff then proceeded West across
200 West Street tO!Wards the entrance to defendant's parking lot (TR. 78-79) According to the testimony given by
the plaintiff at the trial, when she was some eight or nine
feet West of the West line of the public sidewalk running
along the West side of 200 West Street and walking toward
the South entrance to defendant's store building and while
on the driveway immediately North of the parking stalls
on the North side of Pete's T.V. Repair building, and while
watching for cars in the area, she felt her foot slip and
she fell to the ground whereupon she experienced a severe
pain in the area of her left hip (TR. 80). Plaintiff testified that as she was walking toward the defendant's store
just immediately prior to falling she was not watching the
ground in front of her but was watching for cars in the
parking lot area (TR. 80). She then testified that atirer
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she ·had been helped to her feet by some boys and was
standing in the area where she had fu.llen, she looked. down
and sa:w a mound of ice with snow on it which mowid was
two or three inches thick and about five or six inches wide
(TR. 81). Plaintiff then testified rthat she made her way
into the defendant's store where she was later joined by
her husband. After doing some shopping she and her husband .returned to their home where she immediately went
to bed because af the. great pain she was e~riencing in
the .area of her left hip (TR. 84). Plaintiff testified that
she stayed in bed for several weeks thereafter and finally
on or. about the 27th of February, 1965, went to see Doctor. Eugene. Chapman because her injuries did not seem
to be.-improving and.she .was experiencing_ a great deal of
pain ..at .that time (TR. 86) .
. Doctor Chapman .diagnosed a fracture of the left .fe-

moral. neck and. a. slight formation of cystic areas. on the

femoral head (TR. 34).

When :plaintiff's condition did not materially improve

Doctor Chapman recommended an operation, and on De.
cember 14, 1965, he performed a cup arthroiplasty on the.
plaintifLat the Utah Valley Hospital (TR. 42).
On cross-examination art the time of the. trial. plaintiff
testified that after she got out of the family car at defendant's parking lot she observed tihat there was snow
everywhere all over the parking lot and that tJhere were
ruts in the snow.(TR. 92). She.then proceeded East along
the rear of the parked cars through the snow to the side-:
walk on the West side of 200 West Street where there was
no snow (TR. 94). Plaintiff then went .down town on the
public sidewalk on which there was no snow; came back
on the East side of 200. West Street on the public sidewalk
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on which there was no snow; crossed 200 West Street
on which there was no snow; proceeded acros.s the sidewalk on the West side of 200 West Street on which there
was no snow; and entered upon the driveway into defendant's parking lot, which entrance way and parking
lot were completely covered with snow and full of car ruts
(TR. 94-95). Plaintiff testified that she could not see any
blacktop through 1Jhe snow in the area of the entrance way
and the parking lot (TR. 95) , burt that she nevertheless
walked onto the snow without looking down at her feet to
see where she was going because she was looking for cars
in the parking lot area (TR. 95-96). She did not recall
seeing any cars moving towards her or behind her in the
area, and she was !coking for them rather than looking
down to see where she was placing her feet (TR. 96, 98,
99) . Plaintiff testified that she just kept walking through
the snow without looking at her feet, watching for cars,
until she foll (TR. 97). It was not until after she had fallen and had been helped to her feet that she looked down
and saw a mound of ice with snow' on it some two or three
inches high and five or six inches wide (TR. 97) .
The plaintiff further testified on cross-examination
that she had not been at the defendant's store area from
December 31, 1964, until the month of June, 1967, at which
time she and her husband went back to the premises and
pinpointed the spot at which she had fallen, said point being in the middle of the entrance way to defendant's parking lot and approximately eight feet West of the West line
of the public sidewalk running along the West side of 200
West Street (TR. 98-99).
In the deposition taken of plaintiff on .A:pril 14, 1967,
the plaintiff testified she fell at a point which was closer to
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the. south dooc of defendant's store than to the sidewalk
(TR. 10.2) and that in the area behind the place where her
husband had parked the car "it was wet, and it was slick,
and there was snow" (TR 103) . Plaintiff said that she
saw the mound of snow and ice, which was a pretty good
sized one, before she stepped on it and that as she stepped
on the top of the. mound herr foot slipped down the side of
it and she fell to the ground (TR. 104).

STATEMEN'.r OF POINTS
POINT I
.PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT AND HER NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HER INJUR-

IES.

POINT Il.

PLAINTIFF BY HER ACTIONS ASSUMED THE
RISK OF ANY INJURIES SUSTAINED BY HER.

POINT ill
THE COURT IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 6 TO THE JURY
ERRED THiEREBY IN THAT THE JURY WAS NOT
PROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON THE PLAINTIFF'S DUTY TO EXERCISE DUE CARE FOR OWN SAFETY.
POINT IV

THE COURT IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 35 TO THE JURY
ERRED THEREBY IN TI!AT THE JURY WAS Norr
PROPERLY INSTRUCTED REG.ARDiNG THE FACT
THAT THE DEFENDANT .WAS UNDER NO DUTY TO
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WARN TIIE PLAINTIFF AS A BUSINESS VISITOR
OF AN OBVIOUS DANGER.
POINT V
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR DIRECI'ED VERDICT AND FOR JU!DGMENT NO'IWITIISTANDING
THE VERDICT SHOULD HlAVE BEEN GRANTED.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT AND HER NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE. CAUSE OF HER INJURIES.
It is the position of the defendant that the evidence
in this case conclusively shows plaintiff was guilty of negligence herself as a matter of law, which negligence was a
proximate cause of her alleged injuries. It is recognized
that for the purpose8 of this appeal, a jury verdict in favor
of the plaintiff having been entered in the court below, the
evidence must be taken most favorably to the position of
the plaintiff. However, whether the Court considers 1Jhe
evidence and testimony of the plaintiff given at the trial
or as given in her deposition, it appears that the most favorable interpretation of the same is that plaintiff knew that
the parking lot was covered with snow and full of ruts and
was slick; that the public side'Wa.lks and street running
alongside of the parking lot was dry and free. of snow and
ice; that the day was clear; that the plaintiff was a woman
in her mid-fifties with no physical disabilities; and that
plaintiff consciously entered upon the snow and ice in the
parking lot without watching where she was putting her
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feet because she claimed she was looking for traffic mov-

ing in the parking lot, although she did not see any traffic

moving in the area for some 20 minutes after she had fallen.
It is the defendant's contention that the case of McALLISTER VS. BYBEE, 19 Utah 2d 40, 425 P.2d 778 is determinall\ie of this ca:se. Ln the McALLISTER case, ~he plaintiff, according to her testimony, tripped over a cement obstruction she had know about for years, and that the same
was in plain sight on a clear day and was there to see if
anyone had but looked. In its decision, this !Honorable
Court cited the case of WHITMAN VS. GRANT, 16 Utah
2d 81, 395 P.2d 918, and quoted the following language:

..The plaintiff is confrooted with the basic proposition
that when there is a hazard which is plainly visible,
. ordinarily one is charged with the duty of seeing and
avoiding it. And if he fails to do so, it is concluded
that be was negligent either in failing to look or in
failing to heed what he saw."

Mr. Ohief Justice Crockett in commenting on the
above language made observations to the effect that the
quotation as set out was not complete in that the GRANT
case (supra) further held that "ordinarily one is ~ged
with such a duty." Chief Justice Crockett observed,
"But as was expl ained in that opinion following the
quoted language, if there are extenuating circumstances so that a person in the exercise of due care might
fail to see or heed the hazard, it may be found that
1

his conduct was not negligent." .·

In the case now before the Court, the plaintiff woo.Id
excuse her failure to see and look where she was walking
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by the fact that she claims she was watching for traffic

in the area. However, by her own testimony at the trial,
there was no traffic moving and although she knew the
parking lot was rutted, covered with snow and slick, she
nevertheless failed to watch where she was s<tepping at all,
~nd it was not until after she had fallen that she bothered
to look specifically as the place where she had been stepping. Defendant contends that the language of the GRANT
2·1se (sup:ca) does not e~tend so far as to excuse the plaintiff from the consequences of deliberately walking on an
area which she knew to be dangerous without paying close
attention to what she was doing.
In the GRANT case (supra) a Motion for Summaey
Judgment on the ground of contributory negligence was
granted and affirmed where it appeared that the plaintiff,
who had delivered merchandise to a department store, was
directed to go down stairs and out the door to return to his
truck and who went to the first door he saw, opened it and
stepped orff backwards into an elevator shaft without taking a precautionary glance beyond the door. This Court
in considering whether the plaintiff could be guilty of negligence for failing to see that which was evident, used the
following language:
"In order to justify holding that a jury que£.tion as to
negligence exists, where injury has resulted from an
observable hazard, it is essential that thEre be something which can be regarded as tending to distract
the plaintiff's attention or to prevent him from seeing
the danger, thus providing some reasonable basis for a
finding that even though he exercised due care he could
be excused from seeing and avoiding it. For example.
in the recent case of OAMPBELL VS. SAFEWAY
STORES (15 Utah 2d 113, 388 P.2d 409) the plain-
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tiff stumbled over a box in the aisle of the defend-

ant's store which she ordinarily Ehould have seen_·
However, she was a woman of s1omewhat advanced
years, physically inflicted with impair€d. eye3ight, and
most importantly, was preoccupled as she r eaEonably
could be expected to be in searching the shelves for a
certain item of food."
1

In the present case, the plaintifff, according to her
testimony at the trial, while claiming to watch the area foc
moving cars, the presence of which could have been determined at a glance, nevertheless failed to observe at all the
area where she was walking even though she knew that
the ~ea was dangerous and slick by her own testimony.
In the case above referred to CAMPBELL VS. SAFEWAY STORES (supra) where the plaintiff fell over the
small box in the aisle of the store where she was shopping,
the Court in commenting upon the matter of contributory
negligence used the following language:
''We agree that ordinarily one is guilty of contributoq
negligence which will preclude recovecy if she fails to
· see and give heed to a danger which is plain to be
seen. However, as we have held on a number of occasions, this rule is not applicable where there are extenuating circumstances which impair the ability to
see the hazard. They were present in the instant case
in that plaintiff's daughter was going ahead of her
with the grocery cart, and that plaintiff was preoccupied in searching the shelves for csrtain merchandise. There is the further fact that it would not be
unreasonable for one to proceed with at least some
degree of assurance that these aisles are clear of impediments. Under such circumsrtances it is our opinion that a jury question existed· as. to wheth€'r. the
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plaintiff was observing the standard orf care of an ordinary reasonable and prudent person for her own
safety."
Such case differs from the present one in that under
the evidence in this case, the plaintiff knew that the danger was in front of her; that the parking lot .was full of
ruts and was slick with ice and snow; and she nevertheless
without even so much as a glance as to where she was
walking, proceeded into the area and consequently slipped
and fell.
Further, in this case, the diversion claimed.by plaintiff
was more imaginary than reial. She was merely looking
for traffic, which by her own testimony was non-existent
at the time. As held by this Court in the case of EISNER
VS. SALT LAKE CITY, 120 Ut. 675, 238 P.2d 416:
"Plainly, according to the authorities, the cause diverting a pede.strian's attention from a known danger
must be unexpected and substantial . . ."
In this case there r€ally was no diveTsion at all. When
the plaintiff cho;;e to walk onto the snow packed, rutted
and slick parking lot, plainly visible, and its condition known
to her, she either saw the condition before her or she did·
not. If she looked she must have seen it and deliberately
or negligently stepped onto it. If she did not look she neglected her duty in traversing the parking lot entrance way.
ROTH V. VERONA BOROUGH, 316 Pa. 279, 175 A. 689.
Either action on the part of plaintiff was negligence and a
proximate cause of: h~ injuries. lt.llLLIGAN VS. CAPI...
'J'OL FURNITURE CO., 8 Ut. 2d 383, 335 P.2d .~J9.
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POINT II
PLAINTIF1F BY HER ACTIONS ASSUMED THE
RISK OF ANY INJURIES SUSTAINEID BY HER.
On the question of assumption of risk, reference is
made to the case of CDA.Y VS. DUNFORD, 121 Utah 177,
239 P.2d 1075, wherein this Court stated and approved the
following language:
"The doctrine of assumption of risk is confined to cases
where the plaintiff not only knew and appreciated the
danger, but voJuntarily put himself in the way of it
and that the essential elements of assumed risk are
knowledge, actual or implied, by the plaintiff of a specific defect or dangerous condition caused by the negligence of a defendant in the violation of some duty
orwing to the plaintiff, together with the plaintiff's
appreciation of the danger to be encountered and his
voluntary exposure of himself to it."
. In the inst.ant case the plaintiff knew full well that
the parking lot was rutted, snow covered, slick and by her
own testimony dangerous, but she nevertheless chose to
walk upon it without taking any precaution whatsoever
to look at her feet as to where she was going, choosing
rather to be looking a:bout for cars in the area which might
be moving, although none were evident and that fact could
have been determined by a very cursory glance, so that
plaintiff could have easily waitched where she was walking
without endangering herself to being hit by moving traffic
in the area. Certainly traffic moving in the ·area would be
moving very slowly and would not constitute nearly so
much danger to her as would falling upon the slick and
rutted surface.
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Reference is made to the california case of LEWIS
VS. COUNTY OF CONmA COSTA, 278 P.2d 756, which
is cited as an authority in the JURY INSTRUCTION
FORMS FOR UTAH, page 59, in which case !it was held
that a mail carrier who in crossing a street in the middle
of a block jwnped over a mud-filled gutter onto a mud·
covered sidewalk which he lmew would be slippery when
he could have avoided the muddy area by retracing his
steps 100 feet or so, ~urned the risk of injury or was contributorily negligent rin so jumping and therefore was not
entitled to recover for injuries sustained when he slipped
and fell on the mud-covered walk. The California court
commented as follows:
"The facts demonstrate that plaintiff actually knew or
must have known of the hazard. He testified that he
knew of the presence of mud in the gutter and on the
sidewalk and that mud ·was slippery. Yet, instead of
going beyond the point of hazard or of retracing hls
steps a mere 100 feet or so to a point where he :bad
last crossed the street without difficulty. he took a
chance and jumped wi1Jh .the untoward results already
narrated. In explanation he said he did not at the
time know how thick the mud on the sidewalk was,
suggesting that in the absence of such lmowledge he
was not fully aware of the hazard. We do not see
the logic of that argument. He was thoroughly aware
that mud covered the sidewalk and it was slippery.
That would seem sufficient to put any adult person
upon actual notice of the hazard. Where the facts
are such that plaintiff must have had knowledge of
the hazardous situation it is equivalent to actual knowledge."
Another feature of the doctrine of assumption of risk
is that the assumption of risk must be voluntary. Refer-
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ence is made to the JURY INSTRUCTION FORMS FOR
UTAH, Form 17 .3 at Page 60, which states:

~-

"Before assumption of risk will bar reoovery it must
be voluntary. To be voluntary these two factors m~t
be present: First, the person in question must have
actual knowledge of a danger or the conditions must
be such that she would have such knowledge rif she exercised ordinary care. Second, she must have freedom
of choice. 'J1his freedom orf choice must come from
circumstances that provide her a reasonable opportunity, without violating any legal or moral duty to
safely refuse to expose herself to the danger in ques... tion~"'

In the present case the plaintiff testified that she did
1.alow of the existence of the danger from the snow and ice
which was on the parking lot. She had the freedom of
choice in that by her own testimony the public sidewalk
-was free and clear of snow so that she could have easily
entered the north door of defendant's store by walking
along the dry public sidewalk without exposing herself to
apy of the hazards of the snow and ice which she described
as being present upon the parking lot which she chose
to cross.

;f)~endant contends that the evidence is uncontradic-

ted to the effect that the plaintiff voluntarily put herself
in a position of danger of which she was aware when she
h.ad another alternative which was easily available to her
and which would have been completely safe for her to
pursue.

POINT ill

THE COURT IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 6 W THE JURY
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ERRED TH!EREBY IN THAT THE JURY WAS NOT
PROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON THE PLAINTIFF'S DUTY TO EXERCISE DUE CARE FOR OWN SAFETY.
The plaintiff in this case testified that she knew of
the existence of the snow and ice which she claimed to be
on defendant's parking lot and that the same was slick and
dangerous. It is defendant's contenti011J that under such
circumstances the obligation and duty of the plaintiff to
exercise ordinary care for her safety is greater than would
be the case if the plaintiff were not aware of the existence_
of such dangerous circumstances. Defendant requested
the following instruction:
No. 6 (R68)

"You are instructed that inasmuch as the amolint of

caution used by. the ordinary prudent person -varies in direct proportion to the danger known to. be in-_
volved in her undertaking, it follows that in the ex'."
ercise of ordinary care, the amount of caution required will vary in accordance with the nature of the act and
the surrounding ciTcumstances. To put the ma~
in another way, the amount of cautioo required by
the law increases as does the danger that reasonably
should be apprehended. Thus in this case if you find
that the plaintiff knew oc in the exercise of rea.SOn- able care should have known that the area over which
she was traveling was slick, the standar-d of <.>are imposed by law upon the plaintiff for her safety would
be increased proportionately."

The Court gave the following instruction, No. 16, to
the jury: (R31)
"The plaintiff in this case had a duty to make -ll. reasonable observation along the path she moved at the
time she _ passed from the sidewalk_ and stepped into
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the rpath she chose to take and if you find from the
evidence in this case that the plaintiff did not make a
reasonable observation of the premises as she moved
along and that she knew or should have known of the
peril that there existed, and by the exercise of due
care she could have avoided the peril of her falling,
but failed to exercise due care to avoid said peril, then
the plaintiff was negligent."
·The instruction requested by the defendant was taken
from JURY INSTRUCTION FORMS FOR UTAH, No.
15.3, page 48, and the court's refusal to give such instruction as requested was excepted to by the defendant (TR.
165).
Since the plaintiff testified that she was aware of the
existence of the snow and ice on the parking lot and that
it was slick, defendant feels that it was entitled to an instruction which specifioally called the attention of the jury
to the fact that the obligation of a person under such circumstances is greater than ordinarily would be the case
and that the obligation to exercise ordinary care for one's
safety increases in direct proportion to the danger known
to be involved. In this case the plaintiff knew of a dangerous condition and conseqrmtly her obligation to exercise due care for her own safety was patent.

POINT IV
_ THE COURT IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 35 TO THE JURY
ERRED THEREBY IN THAT THE JURY WAS NOT
PROPERLY INSTRUCTED REGARIDING THE FACT
THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS UNDER NO DUTY TO
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WARN THE PLAINTIFF AS A BUSINESS VISITOR
OF AN OBVIOUS DANGER.
In this case the plaintiff was a business. visitor to the
premises of the defendant. By the testimony of the. plaintiff herself the entrance way and parking lot of the defendant's premises over which the plaintiff would be obliged
to travel if she were to enter the south door of the store
building were covered with snow and ice, were rutted and
were slick. The defendant requested instruction No. 35
(unnumbered page in rthe ra."000. between .pages. 97 and 98)
asking the court to instruct the jury in part as follows:

"However, the responsibility of one having control of
the premises is not absolute. It is not that of an in•
surer. If there is danger attending upon the entry
to the premises, the owner is entitled .to_ assume that _
a business visitor will perceive that which would. be
obvious to her upon the _ordinary use of her own senses.
There is no duty on the part of an owner to give a
businss visitor notice of an obvious danger."
This instruction was taken from UNIFORM JURY
INSTRUCTIONS FOR UTAH, Form 43.10, page 119.- aIJ4.
the refusal of the court to give this instruction was duly
excepted to by the defendant (TR. 166).
The court lbelow g~ve its instruction No. 12 ·.· (R. 28)
to the jury as follows:

"You are instructed that the plaintiff in this case was·
a business visitor upon the. premises .occupied . by. the
defendant. You are instructed one who extends to a

business visitor an invitation, express or implied,, is
obliged to· refrain from acts of' negli~nce .and ·to ~·
ercise ocdinary care to· keev the premises m · a· condi-· tion reasonably safe for the .business _of the visitor. In
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the absence of appearances that would otherwise caution a reasonable prudent person in a like position to
the contrary, a business visitor has the right to assume
that the premises which she was invited to enter are
reasonably safe for the purposes for which the invitation was extended and to act on that assumption. You
are instructed that the employees of the defendant
have a duty to warn the plaintiff of danger of which
they were aware of which the plaintiff had no knowledge."
The evidence is clear from the testimony of the plaintiff herself that she in fact did know of the danger that
existed upon the parking lot and by her description of the
situation the condition was perfectly obvious so that the
court's _instruction to the jury to the effect that the defendant was under a duty to warn the plaintiff of danger
of whioh the plaintiff had no knowledge was inappropriate
and it was error for the court to refuse to instruct the jury
as requested by the defendant that the defendant was not
under any duty to warn the plaintiff of the existence of the
obvious danger which she described and of which she actually was very much aware.
POINT V
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR DIREcrED VERDICT AND FOR JU\DGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT SHOULD HiAVE BEEN GRANTED.
, At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence the defendant, pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, moved the court for a directed verdict on the grounds that the evidence of the plaintiff showed
as a matter of law that the plaintiff was negligent and that
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such negligence was a proximate cause of her injury and
further that the plaintiff by undertaking to walk. !in the
parking lot area without watching where she was placing
her feet, assumed the risk of injury by reason of her knowledge of the dangerous condition therein existing according
to her own testimony. Defendant's motion was denied by
the court (TR. 111).
At the close of all of the evidence the defendant again
renewed its motion for a directed verdict on the same.
grounds, which motion was denied by the court (TR. 125).
Thereafter and within ten days after the reception
of the verdict the defendant moved the court pursuant to
Rule 50(b) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in its favor on
the grounds hereinabove referred to and as therein stated
(R. 109).
Defendant believes that these motions should have
been granted and that the court erred in failing to do so
for the reason that the plaintiff wru; negligent as a matter
of law whioh was a proximate cause of her injuries and
that the plaintiff further assumed the risk of injuries by
reason of her conduct in entering upon the parking lot and
entrance way of the defendant without watching where she
was placing her feet, knowing of the dangerous condition
thereon existing and an alterative route being available to
her which would have been safe and free from danger.
The arguments set forth in Points I and II above are
hereby refrred to and adopted as a part hereof.
CONCLUSION
Considering all evidence and testimony in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, such evidence and testi-
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mony nevertheless shows as a matter of law that the plaintiff was negligent and that such egligencn was a proximate
cause of her injuries and that the plaintiff further assumed
the risk of injury by reason of her conduct in entering upon the parking lot of the defendant under the conditions
which existed. The court below erred in failing to direct
a verdict in favor of the defendant and in failing to grant
the .defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.
The judgment below should be reversed and judgment
of no cause of action should be granted by this Court, in
favor of the defendant, 0. P. Skaggs Foodliner.
Respectfully submitted,
CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, for
CHRISTENSEN, PAULsON & TAYLOR
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
55 East Center Street
Provo, Utah 84601
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